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apital controls have been in place in Cyprus now for about two and a half months 
following their introduction on March 27th. In the meantime, some 15 decrees have 
been  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  prolonging  the  restrictions  but  with 
substantial  relaxation  regarding  to  payments  both  domestically  and  abroad.  In  addition, 
exemptions have been granted for selected foreign banks for operations with non-residents. 
To date, 16 foreign banks have been placed on the list of institutions benefiting from these 
exemptions.  Tight  restrictions  continue  to  be  placed  on  cash  withdrawals  and  transfers 
between institutions that do not correspond to payments that can be classified as ‘normal 
business’. 
One can argue that capital controls in their current form should not significantly hamper the 
normal business of firms, or at least of small- and medium-sized enterprises. However, they 
do affect firms indirectly, through negative expectations. These negative expectations have 
already materialised into a negative shock with the downgrading of Hellenic Bank on April 
23rd from a B rating to “restricted default”.1 In the current context, banks in Cyprus have 
little access to new funds and are suffering a slower but systematic drainage of their existing 
funds.  Capital  controls  can  slow  down  the  trend  but  cannot  stop  it.  Figure  1  shows  the 
deposit outflows registered in March and April 2013, and although the figures include the 
reduction in deposits due to bail-in write-downs, they still represent a significant outflow 
even if those are taken into account.2 Furthermore, banks in Cyprus appear to have limited 
access  to  other  funds  as  can  be  inferred  from  the  still  relatively  high  levels  of  ELA 
(emergency liquidity assistance) as a share of GDP, which appear in the balance sheet of the 
Central Bank of Cyprus.3  
                                                   
1 Reuters, 23 April 2013. 
2 The bail-in represented a conversion of about €3.19 billion into capital (see Central Bank of Cyprus, 
Media & Publications, “The financial position of the Bank of Cyprus”, 17 May 2013). 
3 It was agreed by the Eurosystem in April 2012 to classify Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
provided to the domestic credit institutions under “Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions in 
Euro” (see Central Bank of Ireland Financial Statements, April 2013). The Central Bank of Cyprus has 
registered in its balance sheet an additional €2.3 billion under this classification from February to 
April  2013  (representing  approximately  13%  of  Cyprus’  2012  GDP).  It  is  important  to  note  that 
additional ELA represents further government debt if the collateral is not good enough. 
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Figure 1. Total deposits of MFIs from non-MFIs in Cyprus 
 (transactions as a percent of outstanding amounts in the beginning of the period) 
 
Note: MFIs = Monetary financial institutions. 
Source: Central Bank of Cyprus, Monetary and Financial Statistics, May 2013. 
With  limited  access  to  funds,  banks  have  nearly  frozen  all  new  credit.  Furthermore,  no 
distinction  is  being  drawn  between  consumer  credit,  investment  or  credit  for  working 
capital:  all  types  of  credit  have  been  put  on  hold,  resulting  in  a  significant  decline  in 
outstanding loans, as shown in Figure 2. Although the household sector has been the most 
significantly  affected,  April  witnessed  a  significant  decline  in  loans  to  non-financial 
corporations, and the result is that more and more businesses are struggling with liquidity 
management, and few are likely to survive the strain.  
Figure 2. Loans from MFIs to the non-MFIs and the household sector in Cyprus 
 (transactions as a percent of outstanding amounts in the beginning of the period)  
 
Note: The peak in December is due to seasonal effects. 
Sources: Central Bank of Cyprus, Monetary and Financial Statistics, May 2013.  
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When can capital controls in Cyprus be lifted? Conventional wisdom suggests that capital 
controls  cannot  be  lifted  until  convincing  recapitalisation  plans  for  the  Cypriot  banking 
sector are finalised and made public. The final recapitalisation plans for the Bank of Cyprus, 
including  the  decision  on  the  final  haircut  to  be  applied  to  unsecured  deposits  and  the 
unfreezing  of  accounts  (unsecured  deposits  have  already  been  ‘cut’  by  37.5%,  with  the 
remaining 22.5% frozen in waiting) is expected by the end of June.4 By more or less the same 
time,  the  recapitalisation  plans  for  the  credit  cooperative  sector,  including  more  than  90 
institutions that have been treated as a whole due to their mutual guarantee scheme, are also 
to be disclosed. Banks that are not expected to apply for state aid can submit recapitalisation 
plans as late as September. So, in principle, capital controls could be lifted as early as October 
2013. The problem is that unless credit starts pumping in liquidity to finance the working 
capital of businesses and to help them meet their tax obligations in time, non-performing 
loans will continue to pile up. Attempts by the banks to recapitalise will be akin to shooting 
at a moving target. Such a feat requires extraordinary swiftness – a quality that Cypriots 
have not seen much of in recent years. 
The  next  question  is  whether  recapitalisation  plans  will  be  convincing  and  whether  the 
Cypriot banking sector will be able to regain the trust of the public. In the case of credit 
cooperatives and other commercial banks, it all depends on their revealed situation and on 
the plans that are unveiled for their recapitalisation. In the case of the Bank of Cyprus, one 
thing is certain: most if not all depositors who have suffered haircuts in the re-structuring 
process are likely to opt for moving their remaining funds out of this institution as soon as 
capital  controls  are  lifted,  and  little  can  be  inferred  about  the  likely  behaviour  of  the 
remaining depositors. There is a real risk, however, that the authorities have been futilely 
engaged in keeping banks afloat that could have been better left to default, as happened in 
the case of all three of the largest banks in Iceland (Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir).5 
Cypriots are already braced for a difficult 2013, with a fall in the country’s GDP for the 1st 
quarter already reaching -4.1% relative to the same quarter of the previous year, according to 
Eurostat (and -1.3% relative to the 4th quarter of 2012). It is important to observe, however, 
that the full extent of the blow may only come in 2014, several quarters after the beginning of 
the bank restructuring process. In Iceland, the largest fall in GDP was registered in the 4th 
quarter of 2009, a full four quarters after the decision to allow its three largest banks to 
collapse, which took place in the 4th quarter of 2008.6 The full impact of the crisis in Cyprus 
is  also  coming  with  a  delay.  The  large  drop  in  employment  that should  accompany  the 
significant reduction in the size of the banking sector, for instance, is still to materialise. This 
will present an inevitable shock to the economy, which will also mark the end of the banks’ 
restructuring  period.  This  sector  employs  about  18,000  persons  (according  to  2012  data) 
representing about 4.85% of total employment in 2012 (see Figure 3). The laying-off of a 
significant share of these workers will of course have important multiplier effects throughout 
the rest of the economy. This shock will add to an already high unemployment rate of about 
15%, as registered in April 2013, and to which another large pool of unemployed was added 
in May 2013 (unemployment in May 2013 rose by about 3% relative to April 2013, with the 
most seriously affected sectors to date being wholesale and retail trade and construction.  
                                                   
4 Reuters, 28 May 2013. 
5 “Doubts Cast on Icelandic Crisis Model”, Richard Milne, Financial Times, 3 March 2013. 
6  In  October  2008,  the  Icelandic  Parliament  passed  the  Emergency  Act  (No.  125/2008),  granting 
depositors  priority ranking  in  insolvency  proceedings  over that  of  other  unsecured  creditors,  and 
enabling the Icelandic Financial Supervisor to transfer assets and liabilities from the collapsed banks 
to new banks (see EFTA Supervisory Authority, “EFTA Financial Crisis: Emergency Act Compatible 
with the EEA Agreement”, December 2010). 4 | LEONOR COUTINHO 
 
In  short,  the  only  way  to  stop  the  downward  spiral  is  to  devise  a  good  strategy  for 
withdrawing capital controls soon and reinstating the normal functioning of the banking 
sector.  
Figure 3. Sectoral distribution of employment in Cyprus, 2012 
 
Note: Sectors that account for less than 2% of employment have been omitted. 
Source: Cystat (Cyprus Statistical Authority).  
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